The present document derives from a report published on the site of the Hellenic Bureau for Marine Casualties Investigation (HBMCI, www.hbmci.gov.gr). It consists a safety recommendation concluded following the safety investigation of issued marine casualty, according to the provisions of National Law 4033/2011, as applied with the only purpose to improve maritime safety.

SAFETY RECOMMENDATION No: 45/2015

Text of Safety Recommendation:
Take effective action fleet wide to ensure that, during the appraisal phase of voyage planning, under heavy weather conditions, Masters perform a risk assessment according to relevant SMS procedures, so as contingency plans to be developed if required.

No of Safety Investigation Report: 07/2015: Grounding of B/C “GOODFAITH”
(See the full Report here.)

Safety Recommendation addressed to: Managers

Date of publication: 13/12/2017

No of Safety Investigation Report: 07/2015: Grounding of B/C “GOODFAITH”

INFORMATION OF ACCIDENT

Grounding of B/C “GOODFAITH”

Type of vessel: Bulk Carrier
Year of built: 1994

Course of events
On the 10th of February 2015 the vessel had sailed from Elefsis/Greece in ballast condition heading to Odessa/Ukraine for loading, with 22 crew members. On the morning of 10th of February 2015, the National Meteorological Service had issued a storm warning at the sea area of South Evvoikos–Kafireas Strait, that forecasted N–NE winds 9–10 bfrs, and wave height of 3.5m – 6.5m. At 0000, the 2nd Officer took over the navigational watch while the Master had left from the bridge at approximately 0005. At approximately 0050 Goodfaith could hardly be maneuvered with her speed (SOG) slightly over 2.0 knots for the reason that she was encountering severe rolling, pitching and slamming as heavy seas were breaking over her forecastle. The 2nd Officer reported the experiencing situation to Master, as Goodfaith had started to considerably drift to starboard notwithstanding her rudder was set hard to port and her engine to full ahead at 120 rpm. The Master realizing the emergency and the imminent danger of an uncontrollable and violent grounding ordered to alert the crew and activated the general alarm. At approximately 0128, Goodfaith grounded on the rocky coastline at the Northwest seafront of Andros Island. Most of the crew were rescued by a Hellenic Navy helicopter and 04 remained onboard and then were rescued by shore rescue personnel.

Relevant comments on the safety recommendation
From the information derived during the investigation process, it was evident that during the appraisal of the voyage planning there was no risk assessment carried out and no contingency plans were developed to take into account the prevailing bad weather conditions, in accordance with relevant IMO guidelines for Voyage planning (IMO Res. A.893(21)).

Extent of damage
M/V Goodfaith had sustained severe damages, heavy indentations, cracks and fractures lengthwise on her bottom and side shell plating, including underwater hull damages in her fore section, cargo holds and engine room. It was apparent that the repair costs exceeded the insured value of the vessel therefore she was considered a constructive total loss. M/V Goodfaith was towed on the 10th of July 2015 from Andros to a shipyard facility in Salamis island (Greece) until her final destination to the demolition yard for its disposal on the 17th of October 2015.
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Conclusions led to safety recommendation

- There was no risk assessment carried out and no contingency plans were developed to take into account the prevailing bad weather conditions.
- The available navigational information, as presented in the nautical chart used on board and described in the relevant guidance of the admiralty sailing directions had not been appraised sufficiently by the Master and the OOW.
- The only actions that were taken to counteract the effects of strong pitching and rolling, that the vessel was facing was to change to manual steering, reduce engine speed and change of course so as the waves to face the ship at the port bow.