SAFETY RECOMMENDATION No: 38/2014

Text of Safety Recommendation:

Review the Statutory Certificate issuance system in order to ensure that all equipment required by the applied International Conventions is recorded at the respective fields of the Certificates.

No of Safety Investigation Report:

05/2014: Foundering of RoRo Cargo Agia Marina 25 nm West of Cape Gramvousa Kriti island.

(See the full Report here.)

Safety Recommendation addressed to:

The Classification Society of the vessel (Dromon Bureau of Shipping)

Date of publication:

09/11/2016

Comments-Remarks:

INFORMATION OF ACCIDENT

Type of vessel: Ro-Ro Cargo Ship
Year of built: 1966

Foundering of RoRo Cargo Agia Marina 25 nm West of Cape Gramvousa Kriti island.

Course of events

On the 24th of April 2014, at approximately 01:00, Ro-Ro cargo AG MARINA (figure 1) was on passage at the sea area 25 nm west of Gramvousa Islet Crete, Greece. It was reported that on 21 April 2014 she had departed from Montenegro manned with seven crew members and loaded with six trucks to be discharged at a port of Ukraine.
The present document derives from a report published on the site of the Hellenic Bureau for Marine Casualties Investigation (HBMCI, www.hbmci.gov.gr) and consists a safety recommendation which was reached after a safety investigation of a marine casualty, according to the provisions of National Law 4033/2011, with purpose to improve maritime safety and protection of sea environment.

The navigational crew of AG MARINA was comprised of two navigational Officers, the Master and the Chief Mate. The vessel operated on a “6 on - 6 off” single bridge watch schedule with the Master performing the 0600-1200 and 1800-2400 watch while the Chief Mate was on the 0000-0600 and 1200-1800 watch. At 00:00 on 24 April 2014, the Chief Mate relieved the Master and took over the bridge watch. By that time encountering weather condition were heavy with northern wind close to 8 bfrs and high waves. At approximately 15 minutes after the watch hand-over a big wave hit Agia Marina on her aft section and forced her to turn to starboard. Subsequently the vessel started encountering heavy list to starboard eventually increasing under heavy rolling. Chief mate alerted Master and the rest of the crew resting at their cabins located at the same deck with the bridge. Master ordered the crew to put on their thermal suits and lifejackets in order to abandon the ship. According to statements, all crew members jumped into the sea and Agia Marina sank within twenty minutes. Four crew members that reported to have been grouped, managed to get on a floating life raft. Piraeus JRCC launched a SAR operation deploying Coast Guard patrol vessels, airborne units as well as nearby vessels. At approximately 0735 Agia Marina’s life raft was spotted by M/V Princess Maria and the four castaways were recovered and transferred ashore by the Coast Guard patrol vessel. The Search & Rescue Operation continued for the next three days following 72 hours nevertheless the Master and the two crew members of Agia Marina were not found.

Consequences (to individuals, environment, property)
04 crew members rescued - 03 crew members reported missing and never found. Restricted pollution of diesel oil, total loss of the vessel.

Figure 1: RoRo Cargo Agia Marina. The photo was taken by the time she was named Agios Nikolaos.
The present document derives from a report published on the site of the Hellenic Bureau for Marine Casualties Investigation (HBMCI, www.hbmci.gov.gr) and consists a safety recommendation which was reached after a safety investigation of a marine casualty, according to the provisions of National Law 4033/2011, with purpose to improve maritime safety and protection of sea environment.

**Conclusions**

1. The Master of Agia Marina had fake Certificate of Competence as well as fake GMDSS operator’s certificate.
2. The Master and Chief Officer disregarded the weather conditions anticipated to be encountered at the sea area Agia Marina was navigating.
3. The navigational performance of the Master and the Chief Mate of Agia Marina was poor failing to elaborate and comprehend the weather information in relation to her operational limitations.
4. The operational limitations of Agia Marina were disregarded by the Master and the Chief Mate.
5. The Master’s decision to navigate at open sea in bad weather conditions as well as the poor navigation in relation to Agia Marine operational limitations put Agia Marina and her crew at risk.
6. The Navigational Officers failed to plan and conduct an appropriate passage plan in view of the intended voyage disregarding basic navigational methods under good the seamanship and the safe operation of Agia Marina.
7. STCW '78/Table A-II/3, as applied/Function: “Navigation at the operational level” was not for the competence to: “Plan and conduct a coastal passage and determine position” was not demonstrated by the Master and the Chief Officer of Agia Marina.
8. Agia Marina was not equipped with Automatic Identification System as it was not provided by her Statutory Certificates issued by the RO, in contravention to the respective provisions of SOLAS.

![Figure 2: Sketch on electronic chart of the routes to be followed towards Dardanelle Strait compared with Agia Marinas’s sinking position.](image-url)