SAFETY RECOMMENDATION No: 17/2014

Text of Safety Recommendation:
Review the manning levels fleet-wide, taking into account the trading operations workload in relation to fatigue mitigation following provisions of relevant International Instruments and guidelines, as deemed appropriate.

No of Safety Investigation Report: 02/2014: Grounding of B/C “INCE INEBOLU” (See the full Report here.)

Safety Recommendation addressed to: Managers/Owners

Date of publication: 31/12/2015

Comments-Remarks:

INFORMATION OF ACCIDENT

Type of vessel: Bulk Carrier
Year of built: 11/2002

Grounding of B/C “INCE INEBOLU”
On 30 August 2014, Ince Inebolu had sailed from Hodeidah/Yemen, located in the Red Sea, with 22 crew members on board, in ballast condition heading to Novorossiysk/Russia for loading. Following her passage plan, she exited Suez Canal and continued her passage at open sea towards Canakkale Strait.
By that time cargo cleaning operations had been deployed, engaging almost all deck ratings, including the ABs forming part of the navigational watch. On 05 September 2014, at approximately 0000, the Second Officer took over the navigational watch (0000 – 0400). The watch handover was carried out without any particular navigational remarks, steering was in autopilot heading to 318° while Ince Inebolu was running at about 13 knots and no look out watch was posted. However slight changes to Ince Inebolu course were recorded due to drifting.
The investigation process showed that probably from 0130 or shortly after, the 2nd Officer was not monitoring her passage as the vessel’s positions were not plotted on the navigational chart and at approximately 0200 and he fell asleep. According to AIS information, the last selected course that was set by autopilot, was maintained throughout the 2nd Officer’s navigational watch.

According to crew reports, on 03 September, during the Suez Canal crossing, the Bridge Navigational Watch Alarm System (BNWAS) had been deactivated, and it had not been reactivated since then. At approximately 0405 Ince Inebolu while running at approximately 13 knots, grounded on the south east rocky coastline of Astypalaia Island-Greece. At the time of the marine casualty the relieving Navigational Officer had not been called for duty.
Weather conditions were reported to be very good (wind force 2-3 bfrs, sea state calm with very good visibility) and it was still dark.

Relevant comments on safety recommendation

- Four crew members were available to perform the cleaning and washing operation.
- Nonetheless the ABs, forming part of the navigational
- watch, were deployed for the hold cleaning operation, under the pressure of the remaining time before transiting Canakkale in relation to the time required for the operation to be conducted and the liability to present Ince Inebolu fit for loading at the loading port.
- It was inferred that, in practical terms, Ince Inebolu deck resources were insufficient and scanty in numbers to carry out demanding deck operations under the voyage limitations in time and navigation to the loading port.
The present document derives from a report published on the site of the Hellenic Bureau for Marine Casualties Investigation (HBMCI, [www.hbmci.gov.gr](http://www.hbmci.gov.gr)). It consists a safety recommendation concluded following the safety investigation of issued marine casualty, according to the provisions of National Law 4033/2011, as applied with the only purpose to improve maritime safety.

**Grounding point of Ince Inebolu at Astypalaia Island.**

**Ince Inebolu anchored at Astypalaia.**

**Extent of damage**

Due to the heavy impact on the rocky coastline, several compartments of her bow section were damaged to an extent of about 21 m of length longitudinally. More specific the damages reported to be cracks and hull plating deformation at forepeak tank, collision bulkhead, No. 1 cargo Hold, No 1 port and starboard ballast tanks. No injuries and no pollution was reported.

**Deformed starboard bottom fore section.**

**The crack at inner bottom plate of No 1 cargo hold.**

**Marine casualty probable causes**

The safety Investigation and analysis highlighted the following main contributing and underlined factors that led to the marine casualty as presented in random order:

- Absence of posted look out at the night watch;
- The OOW fell asleep due to fatigue;
- The Bridge Watch Navigation Alarm (BNWAS) was switched off, and the main Navigational equipment were ineffectively being used.

**Safety recommendation conclusions**

1. Res. MSC.353(92) amendments to ISM Code/Chapter 6/resources and Personnel in line with Regulation 2.7 of the Maritime Labour Convention 2006 for determining and reviewing manning levels as well as Res. A. 772 (18) to meet the peak workload situations and conditions were not taken in full account by the Company.
2. The 2nd Officer was affected by fatigue due to undertaken clerical work in conjunction with lack of sleep and poor quality of rest prior to his watch that led to drowsiness and falling asleep.
3. The ABs forming part of the navigational night watches were deployed to cargo hold washing operations, disregarding COLREGS and STCW principal provisions and consequently the navigational effective watch.
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had been notably weakened.