The present document derives from a report published on the site of the Hellenic Bureau for Marine Casualties Investigation (HBMCI, www.hbmci.gov.gr). It consists a safety recommendation concluded following the safety investigation of issued marine casualty, according to the provisions of National Law 4033/2011, as applied with the only purpose to improve maritime safety.

SAFETY RECOMMENDATION No: 11/2014

Text of Safety Recommendation:
Take effective actions fleet-wide in order to ensure that Masters follow the Company’s policy in regard to safety of navigation and watchkeeping under COLREGS and STCW requirements at all times, in priority to vessel’s trading operations.

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<th>02/2014: Grounding of B/C “INCE INEBOLU” (See the full Report here.)</th>
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INFORMATION OF ACCIDENT

Grounding of B/C “INCE INEBOLU”

Course of events
On 30 August 2014, Ince Inebolu had sailed from Hodeidah/Yemen, located in the Red Sea, with 22 crew members on board, in ballast condition heading to Novorossiysk/Russia for loading. Following her passage plan, she exited Suez Canal and continued her passage at open sea towards Canakkale Strait. By that time cargo cleaning operations had been deployed, engaging almost all deck ratings, including the ABs forming part of the navigational watch.

On 05 September 2014, at approximately 0000, the Second Officer took over the navigational watch (0000 – 0400). The watch handover was carried out without any particular navigational remarks, steering was in autopilot heading to 318° while Ince Inebolu was running at about 13 knots and no look out watch was posted. However slight changes to Ince Inebolu course were recorded due to drifting.

The investigation process showed that probably from 0130 or shortly after, the 2nd Officer was not monitoring her passage as the vessel’s positions were not plotted on the navigational chart and at approximately 0200 and he fell asleep. According to AIS information, the last selected course that was set by autopilot, was maintained throughout Second Officer’s navigational watch. According to crew reports, on 03 September, during the Suez Canal crossing, the Bridge Navigational Watch Alarm System (BNWAS) had been deactivated, and it had not been reactivated since then. At approximately 0405 Ince Inebolu while running at approximately 13 knots, grounded on the south east rocky coastline of Astypalaia Island-Greece. At the time of the marine casualty the relieving Navigational Officer had not been called for duty. Weather conditions were reported to be very good (wind force 2-3 bfrs, sea state calm with very good visibility) and it was still dark.

Relevant comments on the safety recommendation
- The decision to relieve the ABs from their look-out watch duties had notably weakened the navigational bridge effective watch by removing a safeguard of paramount importance.
- However, considering the limited time to reach Canakkale entrance, it was decided to strengthen the available crew capacity for the cargo cleaning operation with the ABs that were exclusively performing watch keeping duties, as look outs.
- The Master deployed the ABs (Look out watch) got the cargo cleaning operations, under the pressure of the remaining time before transiting Canakkale in relation to the time required for the operation to be conducted and his liability to present Ince Inebolu fit for loading at the loading port.
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Extent of damage
Due to the heavy impact on the rocky coastline, several compartments of Ince Inebolu bow section were damaged to an extent of about 21 m of length longitudinally. More specific the damages reported to be cracks and hull plating deformation at forepeak tank, collision bulkhead, No. 1 cargo Hold, No 1 port and starboard ballast tanks. No injuries and no pollution was reported.

Marine Casualty probable causes
The safety Investigation and analysis highlighted the following main contributing and underlined factors that led to the marine casualty as presented in random order:

- absence of posted look out at the night watch;
- the OOW fell asleep due to fatigue;
- the Bridge Watch Navigation Alarm (BNWAS) was switched off;
- the main navigational equipment was ineffectively being used without alarm utilities settings.

Safety recommendation conclusions
1. The absence of the AB forming part of the 2nd Officer’s navigational watch had notably weakened the navigational bridge effective watch.
2. COLREGS and STCW principal provisions were disregarded.
3. Obligations, duties, tasks and functions, as foreseen and emanating through STCW Code applicable standards, were disregarded.
4. Failure to follow rules and regulations regarding safe navigation by deciding to strengthen the available crew capacity for the cargo cleaning operation with the ABs that were forming part of the navigational watch at the altar of "Ince Inebolu" effective trading operation.
5. Responsibilities entrusted by the Company and STCW Code/Chapter VIII/Part 4 & Part 4-1, in relation to watch keeping assignment, were disregarded.
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